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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the last fifteen years there has been a rapid growth in the de- 
velopment and use of microsimulation models for public policy ana- 
lysis (for an overview see Merz (1991) and Hancock and Sutherland 
(1992)). The key feature of these models is the calculation of the con- 
sequences of policy measures at the level of the individual household 
or firm by using a representative sample of the population. Until re- 
cently, Belgium had - to put it mlldly - a bit missed the train1. This 
was a regrettable situation because an analysis at the level of the indi- 
vidual (be it the person or the hoalwhold) allows an assessment of the 
distributional consequences of  the policy. And the relevance of  dis- 
tributional considerations to determine the political acceptability of 
proposed measures cannot be overestimated. 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we want topresent the mi- 
crosimulation modelASTER. We hope to convince policy makers that 
this model is a valuable tool in preparing policy measures. We do not 
want to reduce the political discussions to a purely technocratic level, 
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sequences of policy orientations is among others one crucial input in 
the decision process. One of the key features of  the recently deve- 
loped microsimulation models is that the product is very user friend- 
ly. The threshold for the potential users is kept as low as possible. Also 
our product reflects this concern2. Of course it is impossible in this 
paper to illustrate all these menu-driven options graphically. We will 
confine the presentation here to illustrations of possible output of the 
model. For a detailed description and illustration of the practical use 
of the model we refer the interested reader to the Users' Guide (De- 
coster, Rober and Van Dongen (1994)). 
The second objective of this paper follows from our view that the 
proof of  the pudding is in the eating, The best way to see what the 
model does is to present it in the context of a relevant real world si- 
mulation. We have chosen the carbonlenergy tax proposal of the EC- 
commission to illustrate the microsimulation methodology. The dis- 
tributional consequences of this environmental tax proposal are of 
course interesting in themselves. Studies abroad have revealed the 
strongly regressive nature of energy taxes (see Johnson, McKay and 
Smith (1990), Pearson and Smith (1991) and Symons, Proops and Gay 
(1992)). It is interesting to know whether the structure of  expendi- 
ture patterns in Belgium would lead to the same conclusion. 
The  family of microsimulation models is expanding rapidly and our 
model belongs to a small and specific subset. We have confined our- 
selves to 2 static model3  which describes hozuehold behaviour for exo- 
geneously given prices and total expenditures. The policy change which 
can be implemented consists of  a change in the indirect tax struc- 
ture? Of course this is a partial approach. As will become clear in sec- 
tion IV  we assume producer prices to be constant. In our example of 
the carbonlenergy tax this implies that an increase of the excise on 
fuel has no influence on the price of say food or clothing. This means 
that we cannot study general equilibrium effects of policy reforms in 
indirect taxes5. Not only does this mean that we have to neglect the 
price changes of other commodities, induced by changed production 
costs, but aiso that we cannot assess the important distributional ef- 
fects linked with changing employment opportunities in the different 
sectors of the economy. The limitation to implementation of indirect 
tax changes with fixed nominal expenditures distinguishes the model 
from the better known tax-benefit models. In an associate project car- 
ried out at the university of Namur a Belgian tax-benefit model has been developed0. This model allows to assess the distributional im- 
pact of a change in the parameters of the direct tax and transfer sys- 
tem. Many measures of reform of indirect taxes are part of a broader 
package of reform. Think of the decrease of the social security con- 
tributions to be paid by  the employer that are compensated by the 
extra revenues collected from the introduction of  an energy tax. Our 
model only allows to analyse the latter part of the 1-eform  in isolation. 
A major point of f~lture  research in the development of microsimu- 
lation methodology will be the integration of the direct tax-benefit mo- 
del from Namur with the indirect tax model from Leuven. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we shortly 
describe the EC-Commission proposal to introduce a carbonlenergy 
tax in the member countries. In section II!  we present the results of 
the use of the ASTER-model for this policy proposal. This section will 
show how suitable the approach is to identify the winners and the lo- 
sers of this tax reform. In section IV the model itself is briefly explai- 
ned. We present the demand system used to model consumer expen- 
diture behaviour and discuss what the simulation does and does not. 
Section V and VI give an empirical answer to two prominent metho- 
dological questions. Section V investigates whether behavioural reac- 
tions from the part of the households are important in the evaluation 
of policy measures. In section V1 we return to an evergreen in discus- 
sions about income or welfare distribution between households: the 
use of equivalence scales. Section VII concludes. 
11.  THE CARBON- AND ENERGY TAX PROPOSAL OF  THE 
EC 
In the context of the greenhouse problem the EC has committed it- 
self to reduce the CO,-emissions in the year 2000 to the level of  1990. 
The proposal by the Commission to introduce a mixed carbon- and 
energy tax dates from May 13th 1992. To  reduce the emissions the 
commission has proposed to introduce an excise per unit of energy. If 
the excise is differentiated according to the carbon content of the ener- 
gy holder, one speaks about a carbon tax. If there is no such differen- 
tiation one better uses the word energy tax. In the EC-proposal both 
options are combined. The reason is that one does not only want to 
discourage the emission of carbon dioxide, but also stimulate a more 
efficient use of energy. The excise has been fixed at $3 per barrel of  crude oil in 1993. It 
will increase with $1 a year to reach the level of $10 in the year 2000. 
The above mentioned option of a combination of carbon and energy 
tax means that the amount of the excise is related to the carbon con- 
tent for 50% and to the energy content for also 50%. The energy con- 
tent of  a barrel of crude oil is well known and is expressed in giga- 
joule. By using the carbon content of  other forms of  energy relative 
to the one of  crude oil one calculates the carbonlenergy tax per giga- 
joule for these other forms of energy. These figures are then trans- 
formed into excises per unit of energy sold (e.g. kilo of coal, liter of 
fuel etc.). In the first two columns of Table 1  these excises are expres- 
sed in Bfr for 1993 and 2000. 
TABLE 1 
The Europeanproposal for  a cal-bonlenergy tax and the Belgian energy tax in Bfrper 
unit 
Form of energy  Unit  EC-proposal  EC-proposal  Belgium 
1993  2000  1993 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Gasoline  liter  0.564  1.881  0.550 
Gasoil  liter  0.630  2.102  0.000 
LP~  liter  0.388  1.291  0.000 
Natural gas  megajoule  0.015  0.05 1  0.014 
Butane gas  kg  0.7 11  2.370  0.690 
Propzne gas  kg  0.7 17  2.391  0.700 
Fuel  liter  0.630  2.102  0.340 
Coal  kg  0.577  1.925  0.000 
Electricity  kwh  0.089  0.297  0.055 
At this moment the proposal of the commission has not been im- 
plemented yet. But in the meantime the Belgian government has de- 
cided to introduce an energy tax from August 1st 1993 on. It was em- 
bedded in a set of measures to improve the competitive position and 
employment of the Belgian economy. The figures of this tax increase 
for private households are in the third column of Table 1. It has been 
explicitly mentioned that these excises would be taken into account 
at the moment the European tax is introduced. In our simulation this 
Belgian energy tax is already included in the pre-reform situation. We 
have chosen to look at the distributional effects of  the introduction of the complete EC-tax of  the year 2000. We therefore increase the 
existing excises with the difference between column (3) and column 
(2) of  Table 1. 
111.  IDENTIFICATION OF  WINNERS AND LOSERS 
The impact of  the tax reform is calculated for each household sepa- 
rately. This allows to calculate gains and losses for different subgroups 
of the population and hence to identify winners and losers of the re- 
form. For this illustration we have defined the loss concept as the chan- 
ge in net expenditures (nominal expenditures minus total indirect taxes 
to be paid), which is equivalent to the difference in taxes to be paid 
after and before the reform. Other concepts can be chosen within 
ASTER. 
Before investigating the variation of the loss across households, let 
us look at the average result for the whole population and some sum- 
mary characteristics of  the distribution. These are found in Table 2, 
one of  the output tables of the ASTER program. 
TABLE 2 









Coefficient of variation 
Statistic 
Standard deviation of logs 
Gini coefficient 
Atlunson coefficient (&=l  .5) 
Pre-reform  Post-reform  Absolute  Percentage 
(Bfrtyear)  Pfdyear)  change  change 
(Bfrivear',  i%'i 
Above the horizontal line in the table, all figures are calculated as 
averages across households, also the third and fourth column. The third column gives the average absolute loss across all households, and 
hence is not equal to the difference in the averages of  net expendi- 
tures in the first two columns. The same holds for the percentage loss 
in the final column. The first figure of  -0.78% is the average of the 
percentage loss of all households. 
Obviously, the carbonienergy tax causes a substantial increase in 
the indirect taxes to be paid by households. On average the increase 
is Bfr 5123 a year, with a standard deviation of Bfr 2998. There is one 
household in the sample which pays Bfr 33641 more indirect taxes. 
At least one household in the sample has a small gain: Bfr 234. The 
substantial impact of the EC-proposal is also reflected in the percen- 
tage loss: on average -0.78%. The table already reveals that there is 
substantial variation in the loss (and also in expenditures) between 
the households. It is this variation that can be investigated by the rest 
of the ASTER program. 
Figure 1  shows how the absolute loss in Bfr per year increases as 
total expenditures increase. The top decile pays nearly three times as 
much more indirect taxes than the bottom decile (Bfr 8251 and Bfr 
3157 respectively). Of course most people will not adhere to this ab- 
solute loss concept to assess the distributional impact of the reform. 
The deciles are defined on total expenditures so that it is normal that 
the increase in indirect taxes is higher for the higher deciles. 
If we calculate the percentage loss in net expenditures (relative to 
the net expenditures before the tax reform) we get Figure 2. The pic- 
ture is reversed now. The carbonienergy tax proposal seems to be re- 
gressive in terms of total expenditure deciles. The average loss for all 
households is 0.78% of pre-reform net expenditures. But the poorest 
40% uf the households loose relatively more, the richer households 
incur smaller losses. The  picture here confirms the results found abroad 
that energy and carbon taxes have a strongly regressive impact on the 
distribution. This is confirmed by the increase in sixteen comn~only 
used inequality measures, calculated by ASTER (in Table 2 we only 
reproduced the Gini and Atkinson coefficient and the standard de- 
viation of the logs). The figures show that there is an increase in the 
iiizqiialiiy measures, but that it is smal: the Gini increaseb from 0.2748 
to 0.2757, the Atkinson measure from 0.1767 to 0.1779 (for an ine- 
quality aversion parameter of  1.5). 
Of course one can criticise the construction of deciles on the basis 
of nominal expenditures, which are a too crude measure of welfare of 
the household. This is true, and ASTER therefore allows to choose FIGURE 1 
Absolute chnrzge irz  net r.pedztzu.es (117 Bfl 
by expendzture deczles 
-10  2345678910 
deciles of  net expenditures 
other variables to define welfare. One of the main options in this con- 
text is the correction with equivalence scales to adjust for household 
size. We will discuss this topic in section V1. 
Undoubtedly, the distribution of gains and losses over poor and rich 
households is one of  the main items to be discussed in the evaluation 
of  a reform. But the analysis above can be repeated for other divi- 
sions of  the population as well. ASTER offers a choice of  62 availa- 
ble characteristics to define subsets in the population (e.g. whether 
the household lives in a rural or an urban area, whether the house- 
hoid has a home computer or not, whether there is telephone, refri- 
gerator etc.). Needless to say that it depends on the simulation cho- 
sen whether a characteristic is relevant or not. In Figure 3 and 4 we 
give the percentage losses for different age classes of the head of the 
household; and for subgroups defined on the type of energy used to 
heat the house. FIGURE 2 
fircenrage  change in ner expendirures ('in%  j 
by e,xpeizditure deciles 
-1.50' 
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Obviously the households in the age classes of 55 and above incur 
a loss above the average. Partly this is explained by the lower net ex- 
penditures of these groups (the denominator for the percentage loss). 
For the households in the class 25-34 e.g. net expenditures a~iioui~t  to 
Bfr 807105, whereas for those in the class 75-84 this is only Bfr 452001. 
On the other hand expenditure patterns themselves might explain the 
differences between age groups. It is possible that older households 
consume more of the highly taxed goods (e.g. coal) than the younger 
ones (who heat more with e.g. electricity). Given the aim of the paper 
set out above, it is beyond its scope to explain the differential burden 
of the carbcn/energy tax. 
Figure 4 proves that there is indeed substantial differentiation in 
the burden of the carbonienergy tax depending on the type of energy 
used to heat the house. With an average loss of  0.78%, the relative 
winners are the households who use electricity and natural gas, the 
relative losers those who heat with coal and to a lesser extent fuel. FIGURE 3 
Percentage change In net expendztnres (m%) 
by age class 
-1.4 
-lS0 1~ 
age class of head of household 
Note the importance here of taking into account the shares in the po- 
pulation, made up by the different subgroups. Households using coal 
make up only 9% of the households, and electricity is used as main 
source of energy by only 6% of the population. The main sources are 
fuel (41.6%) and natural gas (38%). 
A final illustration of the possibilities of the program is offered in 
Table 3. Until now we first defined subgroups of the population based 
on a given characteristic like total expenditure, age class, occupation 
etc. We then calculated the average loss for these subgroups and com- 
pared. But ASTER also allows to reverse the procedure. Given a loss 
concepi defined by the user (e.g. absolute or percentage loss), the prii- 
gram orders the household from greatest loser to greatest winner and 
then partitions this ordered population in quantiles. With quintiles e.g. 
we then get five subgroups. The first group consists of the 20% grea- 
test losers, the fifth group of  the 20% greatest winners (or in this 
example, the smallest losers). For each subgroup the program calcu- FIGURE 4 
Pe'el.ceiztage clznnge rrl net expei?dltzlres (m% ) 
b~l  source of eizergy 
-lS0  Otherlmissinp 
l 
Coal  Butanelpropan  Wood 
Fuel  Gas  klectricity 
type of  household energy 
lates the average value of  a selected list of  characteristics. Table 3 il- 
lustrates this procedure for the carbonlenergy tax. 
The first three lines provide information of  the ordering process 
by ASTER and the partitioning in quintiles. Reading the table from 
left to right for a selected characteristic, one finds the correlation of 
the characteristic with the position in the loser-winner ordering. Rea- 
ding the table vertically for a selected column, e.g. the first one, one 
finds the characteristics of  e.g. the greatest losers. This approach is 
attractive since it gives a clear answer to the prominent political ques- 
iiiiii: who are the wiii~iers,  who ale the losers? It also allows ro make 
use of  characteristics defined as continuous variables. In contrast, for 
the approach illustrated earlier to be operational, the characteristic 
had to be defined in discrete classes. 
TheTablereveals that  inthe20% greatestlosersgroupwefind house- 
holds with low expenditures, elder people, in smaller and more non AI  erage value of clzaracte~zstzcs  for gaz~lels  and losers 
Characteristic 
Lower bound quintile (%) 
Upper bound quintile (%) 
Average loss (%) 
Net expenditures (Bfr) 
Age head of household (year) 
Number of persons in househ. 
Number of active persons 
Dummy for white collar 
Dummy for higher education 











Quintile 2  Quintile 3  Quintile 4  Qointile 5 
(smallest 
losers) 
-1.06  -0.77  -0.59  -0.41 
-0.77  -0.59  -0.41  0.03 
-0.90  -0.67  -0.50  -0.27 
691 255  803 I99  91 1 122  798 865 
52.11  47.31  46.15  50.98 
2.55  2.73  2.89  2.21 
0.93  1.13  1.23  0.94 
0.28  0.35  0.42  0.35 
0.36  0.50  0.50  0.52 
0.77  0.79  0.83  0.69 
active (probably retired) households, with a smaller proportion of 
white collar and higher educated head of households, and less car ow- 
ners7. 
Of course, we have not exhausted the possibilities of the program 
to evaluate the carbonlenergy tax proposal. For Table 3 e.g. the user 
can choose from a list of 67 characteristics. Before investigating two 
important user options in detail in sections V and VI, we will briefly 
explain in the next section how the simulations take place. 
IV.  STRUCTURE  AND WORKING OF  THE SIMULATION 
PROGRAM 
Figure 5 illustrates the basic structure of the ASTER model. It con- 
sists of three separate modules. In the first step, called M-ASTER, 
the user defines the reform. We describe this part in section 1V.A. The 
second part, F-ASTER,  carries out the simulation for each house- 
hold. The underlying demand system is briefly discussed in section 
-- - 
1V.B. The results of this simulation are then used in the third step, 
E-ASTER, to assess the distributional impact of  the reform. The re- 
sults presented above for the carbonlenergy tax all come from the out- 
put of the E  ASTER module. The E-ASTER  module has many more 
options for the user than shown in the above illustration. But in this 
paper we will not discuss it further. From a policy point of view, the first and third part of the program are the most interesting ones. From 
an academic point of view, the F-ASTER  part is the crucial one. 
FIGURE 5 
Stizlcture oftlze ASTER model 
EVALUATION 
A. M-ASTER: from  tax change to consumer price change 
l  he first part oi  the model performs two tasks. First, it allows the user 
to change VAT rates, excise duties and ad valorem rates on a detailed 
list of 746 commodities. Second, since it is impossible to model hou- 
sehold behaviour for more than 700 commodities, the model calcu- 
lates new consumer prices for 32 aggregates. This is the number of 
commodities for which the demand system has been estimated. The relation between indirect tax components and consumer pri- 
ces for commodity i is given by: 
with:  p,  consumer price for commodity i 
qi producer price for commodity i 
ti  VAT rate for commodity i 
a,  excise duty for commodity i 
vi  ad valorem rate for commodity i 
The windows of the M-ASTER  model provide the pre reform tax 
information for all commodities. The producer price is assumed con- 
stant. In very user friendly windows the user can pick out any com- 
modity to change ti,  ai or  vi,  It is also possible to define global changes 
(e.g. increase the VAT-rate of  6% to a rate of  10%).  The post reform 
consumer price is then calculated for the 32 aggregates. 
In Table 4 we list the pre and post reform consumer price for the 
32 aggregates, using a normalisation of  the producer price equal to 
unity. The commodities changing in price are typed in bold face. Of 
course all relative prices change. The price changes are important: the 
coal price goes up with 20.8%, the fuel price with 27.1%, gasoline be- 
comes 4.7% more expensive and gasoil 10.1%. 
B. FASTER:  price and total expenditure elasticities 
The choice of the functional form of the demand system is highly in- 
spired by the SPIT-model of IFS-London. The mode1 specifies blud- 
get shares and is an extension of the widely used AID-model of Dea- 
ton and Muellbauer (1980) (see Blundell, Pashardes and Weber (1989) 
and Baker, McKay and Symons (1990)). TABEL 4 
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elasticity The functional form to be estimated for each budget share reads 
as: 
M,  =  +  p  log(%)  +  log(^]'+ 7  yi, log pj + EgZ  G'] 
with: log P = C  log  (the Stone price-index) 
j 
and: M),,,=&  the share of  expenditures on good i in the total ex- 
Y  l1 
penditures of household h or 
y,  total expenditures of household h 
y,  expenditures of household h on good i 
p'  consumer price for good j 
p,,  h,  total expenditure effects (to be estimated) 
hij  price effect of price j on good i (to be estimated) 
eih  disturbance term 
In the SPIT-model the same database (the Family Expenditure Sur- 
vey) is used both for estimation of  the behavioural parameters and 
for the simulation of the tax reform. In Belgium we do not have a time 
series of expenditures at the level of the household. The most recent- 
ly available budget survey files the expenditure behaviour of 3235 Bel- 
gian households on a very detailed list of commodities during one year 
(1987-88). Presumably there is too little relative price variation in this 
survey too estimate the price parameters in (2). 
Therefore we have estimated the y,,'s on the National Accounts time 
series. These are yearly data starling in 1953. k~dubt:  we have cho- 
sen for a rather disaggregated demand system of  32 acommodities, 
we have estimated the demand system under the restriction of weakly 
separable preferences. This assumption implies that the household 
takes the decision how to allocate the budget over the different com- 
modities in two steps (called two stage budgeting). First, one decides 
how much to spend on broad categories (e.g. food, clothing, trans- 
puri, etc.). This allocation is deierliiined by rzal incomz and relative 
prices of  these aggregate commodities. Second, the budget for e.g. 
food is allocated to individual commodities (bread, fish, vegetables 
etc.). This allocation is determined by the budget allocated to food in 
the first step and the relative prices of the individual commodities in 
this group. The assumption of weakly separable preferences is there- 
fore not only attractive from a theoretical but also from a statistical point of  view. It imposes a structure on the matrix of price coeffi- 
cients to be estimated, which reduces the size of the estimation pro- 
blem considerably. 
The assumption of weak separability is easily imposed within a Rot- 
terdam specification of the demand system, not in an AID specifica- 
tion. Hence we first have estimated a Rotterdam system, both for the 
first stage and for the subsystems. Since there is a one to one rela- 
tionship between the parameters of  a Rotterdam and an AID speci- 
fication (see Barren et al. (1992)), we could then derive the corres- 
ponding AID-parameters of (2). 
The results are summarised in the third column of Table 4. For ease 
of  interpretation we have transformed the original parameters into 
elasticities8. The limitation to own price  elnsticities follows from ob- 
vious space limitations. Most of the commodities ar rather price ine- 
lastic (only two have an elasticity exceeding unity). The  elasticities for 
the different motor fuels are rather similar (around -0.6). But within 
the household energy sources there is a remarkable difference bet- 
ween fuel (-0.7) and the much less inelastic demands for coal (-0.12), 
natural gas (-0.15) and electricity (-0.05). We will investigate the im- 
pact of these coefficients on the results in section V. 
For the estimation of the total expenditure effects (the  &'S  and 1,'s) 
we can of course make use of the budget survey. Since the real expen- 
diture effect seems to be correlated with being a smoker or not and 
having a car or not, we have estimated the Engel curves of (2) for four 
different subgroups of households: car owners/smokers, car owners1 
non smokers, non car ownerslsmokers and non car ownerslnon smo- 
kers. We also included a white collar dummy, a dummy for higher edu- 
cation, the number of actives and the number of children in rhe house- 
hold, the age of the head of the household and a dummy for the house- 
hold living in a rural area. 
In the simulation program we use the set of coefficients, appro- 
priate for one of  the four subgroups to which a household belongs. 
But in the fourth column of  Table 4 we have for the sake of brevity 
calculated a weighted average of the total expenditure elasticities for 
the four subgroups. Coal is the oilly inferior good, and durables is the 
most clear luxury good. V.  DO  BEHAVIOURAL REACTIONS MATTER? 
It would not be wise to present the price and total expenditure effects 
presented in the previous section as the final answer to the question 
how Belgian households adjust expenditures to changing relative pri- 
ces and real income. More research is needed to compare them with 
previous estimates or with results based on other - on certain aspects 
better - theoretical specifications (e.g. for durables and for zero ex- 
penditures). Yet, at first sight the estimates seem reasonable. 
To investigate the sensitivity of the results with respect to these pa- 
rameters, we have done two other simulations. The first option offered 
by ASTER is to forget about behavioural effects. Households simply 
buy the same quantities after the tax reform as before. This is the as- 
sumption often implicitly made in many "simulations" carried out by 
government officials. The second possibility built in the simulation 
program is to assume constant budget shares. This implies that all to- 
tal expenditure elasticities are equal to one, that all own price elasti- 
cities are equal to minus one and that all cross price elasticities are 
equal to zero. We will refer to the simulation with the estimated pa- 
rameters as Est, the simulation with constant quantities as CtQ and 
the simulation with constant budget shares as CtS. 
On average the absolute increase in total indirect taxes to be paid 
goes down from Bfr 6858 in CtQ to Bfr 5123 in Est and even Bfr 4162 
in CtS. This implies that taking into account the behavioural reac- 
tions of the households on the carbonlenergy tax is indeed important. 
People succeed in avoiding part of  the increased taxes by  adjusting 
their consumption behaviour. This also implies that the frequently 
used assumprion of constant quantities leads to a substantial overesti- 
mation of the revenue effects (on average Bfr 1735 or 34% too high)'. 
The assumption of unitary elasticities is more optimistic about the sub- 
stitution possibilities and leads to the smallest loss. 
Figure 6 illustrates the percentage change in net expenditures for 
the ten deciles of  pre reform net expenditureslO.  The change in the 
level of the loss depending on the assumption made about the beha- 
vioural parameterb is clear. But the regressive iiaiiire of the tax is not 
affected at all. The shift away from the higher taxed commodities 
seems to be independent of the welfare level. The same holds for the 
other characteristics analysed above. Hence the answer to the ques- 
tion in the title of this section is: yes for the level of the loss, but no 
for distributional effects. FIGURE 6 
Percentage clzal~ge  117  ifet  expend~trrres  (111% ) 
for d~ffereirt  assrlrnptlolzs oil belzai~~ol~lnlpammeters 
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+  Estimated behavioural parameters  +  Constant quantities 
+  Constant budget shares (unitary elasticities) 
VI.  DO EQUITdALENCE  SCALES MATTER? 
It is nice to observe how the concept of equivalence scales survives 
time after time more or less deep theoretical criticisms and empirical 
difficulties in calculating or estimating them. The reason is simple: no 
theoretical or empirical weakness can ever expel the urgent practical 
need to adjust nominal variables (e.g. income or expenditures) to ac- 
count for differences in needs. And this is what equivalence scales try 
to do. 
Although the field of application is much broader, most scales that 
have been estimated are numbers which deflate household incomes 
for differences in household size. The number of estimated scales is 
impressive (for an overview see Decoster (1988)). We will not add 
another set of figures to the list. Neither will we investigate which scale 
is the better one. But we will repeat the analysis of the previous sec- 
tion with one set of scales: the ones used by the Belgian National Sta- tistical Institute itself. This is the old scale of the League of Nations, 
introduced in the thirties and used in the N.1.S since the surveys of 
196111. 
Figure 7 plots the losses in net expenditures (in Bfr) for the deci- 
les. There are three lines in the graph. The line with the squares, which 
goes down from left to right, is a recapitulation of Figure 1. The deci- 
les are defined here with uncorrected net expenditures and also the 
loss concept on the vertical axis is uncorrected. If one agrees that this 
is a good proxy for household welfare, then households who are bet- 
ter off, have to pay more. But most people feel that increasing nomi- 
nal expenditures also have to do with increasing family size. This se- 
riously troubles the link between nominal expenditures and welfare. 
If we correct for this by dividing nominal expenditures by the equiva- 
lence scale and then construct the decile distribution, we get the flat 
line denoted by the bullets12. We did not correct the variable on the 
vertical axis, the loss in net expenditures, which is now nearly con- 
stant across the deciles. Even in nominal terms the carbonlenergy tax 
has lost its progressivity. Of course one might argue that this approach 
is a bit inconsistent. If we use a deflated concept on the horizontal 
axis, we also have to divide the loss concept by the equivalence scale. 
This leads to the upper line with the triangles. Again there appears 
some progressivity throughout the deciles. If  we are prepared to ac- 
cept nominal net expenditures divided by the equivalence scale as a 
good proxy for welfare, this figure reveals that the loss in welfare in- 
creases as welfare goes up. 
In section IV we observed that the step from nominal to percen- 
tage losses turned the tax into a very regressive one. Note however 
that it is quite useless to repeat this analysis after one has corrected 
for equivalence scales. If we choose for the consistent approach of ei- 
ther correcting both the variable on the horizontal and the vertical 
axis, or neither of the two, we simply get the same result in terms of 
percentage losses (i.e. Figure 2)13. 
In Figure 7, the correction with an equivalence scale of the varia- 
ble on which the deciles are constructed, reallocates the households 
between rhe decilies. Therefore a sharper piciure is obtained in Figure 
8, where we use the characteristic type of household to subdivide the 
population. 
The equivalence scale now only affects the loss concept on the ver- 
tical axis. As could be expected the impact is considerable. Without 
equivalence scales, larger family size means larger loss. But after cor- FIGURE 7 
Impact of equivalence scales on the decile distribution of nominal losses in net 
expenditures (Bfr) 
-10  1  ;  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
deciles of net expenditures 
,  No correction with equivalence scales  +Correction  with equivalence scales for deciles 
+  Correction for both deciles and nominal loss 
rection, the singles come out as the greatest losers, Per equivalent per- 
son in the family, the loss is smaller the larger is the family. The pic- 
ture of  gainers and losers is completely reversed. Probably one will 
criticise the practice of  dividing the nominal loss by the equivalence 
scale. Yet, I think most people would agree to use equivalence scales 
for increases in nominal income. I don't see why to leave this approach 
for decreases in income. 
Moreover we have already pointed out that one can get rid of the 
equivalence scales problem by looking at percentage losses. Assume 
we define welfare as net expenditure divided by the equivalence scale. 
Figure 9 then shows the percentage loss of  both uncorrected net ex- 
penditure and welfare, since the percentage changes of  these varia- 
bles are the same. 
The loss picture which emerges ressembles very much the correc- 
ted line of Figure 8. Older singles are the great losers. Couples with 
one child are the relative winners. FIGURE 8 
Impact of equivalence scales on the distrib~~tiorz  of nominal losses in net experzditures 
(Bfr)  by type of household 
-'!?i~!~l;  (<65) 
l 
CouplelNo child  Couple12 children  Adult with child 
Single (>65)  Couple11 child  Couplel3+children  Other 
type of household 
+  No correction with equivalence scales 
c  Correction with equivalence scales 
FIGURE 9 
The distribution ofpercentage losses in net expenditures (%)  by type of household 
-lS0  Single ('65)  CouplelNo child  Couple12 children  Adult with child 
Single (265)  Couple11 child  Couplel3+children  Other 
type of household Hence the conclusion is clear and could be expected: the use of 
equivalence scales certainly changes the picture of the distributional 
effects of  tax changes. In the future we hope to enrich the microsi- 
mulation model with other specifications of equivalence scales. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper does not give the final answer to the question about the 
distributional impact of carbon and energy taxes. But it has proposed 
a methodology and an instrument that allows at least partial insight 
in the assessment of the distributional effects of changes in indirect 
taxes. Although the carboll/el~ergy  tax example has only been intro- 
duced for illustrative purposes, it is interesting to see that results found 
abroad also hold in the Belgian case. Environmental taxes are regres- 
sive in terms of  net expenditures and are more heavily felt by older 
households. 
The possibility to model expenditure behaviour at the level of the 
household is one of the main advantages of the microsimulation me- 
thodology. Our model fully exploits this possibility. We have shown 
that these behavioural reactions are important to calculate the ave- 
rage loss. But at least in the context of the carbonlenergy tax, the re- 
gressivity is not affected by the use of  the estimated price and total 
expenditure parameters. This implies that the variation in the expen- 
diture patterns themselves accounts for the major part of the regres- 
sivity. 
The simulation results with and without equivalence scales have 
once more highlighted the importance of this topic. They are but one 
expression of the everlasting question which variable to use to measure 
welfare or burden of  a tax. The microsimulation model is not deve- 
loped to solve this problem. But we hope to enrich ASTER in the near 
future with other and more sophisticated scales than those available 
now. 
The ASTER model is ready for use by interested civil servants or 
government officials. But further research could improve it substan- 
tially. It would be interesting to distinguish short run and long run 
reactions of the consumers. We have to improve the specification for 
durable expenditures. And the fairly disaggregated level of  our de- 
mand system, which has of course advantages on its own, also produ- 
ces many zero expenditures. This is an interesting theoretical pro- 
blem for which we have to find an appropriate solution. And finally, from a policy point of view. the most interesting challenge is to try to 
integrate the model with microsimulation models for social security 
and direct tax benefits. 
NOTES 
1.  An important exception being the simulations carried out at the CSB (Centrum voor 
Sociaal Beleid) of the Univcrsity of Antwerp. The modcl dcvclopcd thcrc covcrs social 
security and is described in Cantillon et al. (1993a). For applications, see Cantillon et 
al. (1993b) and De Lathouwer (1993). 
2.  The model runs in a Windows environment which allows the user to choose from the 
many different options in a vely straightforward way. 
3.  For recent progress in building dynamic models see Harding (1993). 
4.  The model is highly inspired by the SPIT-model (Simulation Program for Indirect Taxcs) 
of the Institute for Fiscal Studies in London. Thanks are due to Paul Baker and Liz 
Symons of IFS for valuable help in transposing the SPIT-experience to the Belgian si- 
tuation. 
5.  For recent research in this field, see Proost and Van Regemorter (1992) and Proost and 
Van Regemorter (1994). 
6.  The work by the authors Dehaspe et al. is still in progress. 
7.  Especially the use of dummies is interesting in this approach. With the dummy switch- 
ing from 0 to 1  if the household has a given characteristic, the value in the table gives 
the percentage of the subgroup who meets the characteristic. In Table 3 e.g. there are 
only 15% of the households belonging to the greatest losers group who have an occu- 
pation classified as white collar. In the greatest winners group this percentage is 35%. 
8.  The elasticities ar not constant, but vary with the budget shares. They have been eva- 
luated for the average share in the budget survey. 
9.  In principle the microsimulation model should also be able to predict aggregate reve- 
nue effects. Because of our concentration on distributional effects, ASTER has not been 
validated yet on this point. But apart from the level of the aggregate variables, the per- 
centage changes might already give some indication. In CtQ total indirect tax revenue 
goes up with 7.2%, in Est with 5.4% and in CtS with 4.4%. 
10. In this figure we make all exception to the rule that all averages are calculated at thc 
level of the household. The problem arises from the fact that under the assumption of 
constant quantities, the budget constraint no longer holds. In the simulation program 
total nominal expenditure is adjusted to meet the changed tax payments. Hence net 
expenditure will be unchanged and becomes useless as a variable to analyse. We there- 
fore have chosen another variable to analyse: total indirect taxes paid by  the house- 
hold. After we got this average figure for the ten deciles, we have divided it by the ave- 
rage pre reform net expenditure level for the deciles. 
11. The scale assigns a weight of 1.0  to a male between 14 and 60, a weight of 0.8 for fema- 
les and for males older than 60, and weights going from 0.2 to 0.8 for children (in- 
creasing linearly with 0.1 for every 2 years starting at the age of  Lj. 
12. The average of  net expenditures equals Bfr 741886, the average of  net expenditures 
deflated with the equivalence scale equals Bfr 423931. The latter distribution is also 
more equal. The gini goes down from 0.2748 to 0.2591. the Atkinson measure from 
0.1767 to 0.1483. 
13. Denote net expenditures by X,  then the percentage loss equals d.~/x.  With an equiva- 
lence scale S,  the percentage loss in corrected net expenditures equals (rix-/s)/(x/s),  which 
is of course the same as dx/x REFERENCES 
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